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Abstract: The banking sector is subject to explicit taxation and to bank regulation and 
supervision with quasi-fiscal implications. The assignment of national fiscal policy 
rights and duties regarding international banks in the EU varies with the fiscal 
instrument and with whether the international bank owns foreign branches or 
subsidiaries. Decentralized national policy-making in the EU gives rise to fiscal 
burdens on banks that differ internationally and with the national origin of banks in 
the same country. This paper discusses the international aspects of the overall fiscal 
regime facing banks in the EU and it evaluates some avenues for reform. 
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1.  Introduction 
  In the past decades, major steps have been undertaken to create a single 
European banking market. The second banking directive of 1989 enables all EU banks 
to operate freely anywhere in the Union. By 1990, all capital controls restricting the 
ownership of foreign bank deposits and other financial instruments were eliminated. 
The introduction of the euro in 1999 similarly eliminated multiple currencies as a 
barrier to international banking operations. Any expectation that these policies would 
lead to the creation of a single European bank market has so far proved wrong. 
Especially at the retail level, Europe’s banking markets remain highly fragmented. 
The European Commission’s Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) aims to bring a 
single financial market closer to reality (see European Commission (1998)). The plan 
identifies a range of barriers in the legal, tax and regulatory areas to be ironed out by 
2005. Outstanding taxation issues are summarized under four headings: tax distortions 
to the placement of savings, harmful tax competition between financial centers, the 
taxation of financial products (life insurance and pension funds), and tax obstacles to 
pan-European company structures and the mobility of persons.
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  While the FSAP addresses some specific tax issues, its scope does not include 
corporate income taxation and Value Added Taxation (VAT) in general nor several 
other fiscal and quasi-fiscal instruments that can be expected to affect the location and 
efficiency of banking in Europe. Deposit insurance systems with their obvious fiscal 
implications, for instance, continue to differ materially across EU member states. 
Similarly, distressed banks in the EU have to knock on different doors if they want to 
receive liquidity support in the form of concessionary loans from central banks or 
direct capital support from national treasuries - with the potential for differences in 
national treatments.  
  In the EU there is already considerable international trade in financial services. 
In particular, there are several ‘financial centers’ – notably the UK and Luxembourg -
with relatively large banking sectors that provide extensive financial services to non-
residents as reflected in large external banking assets and liabilities. As seen in Table 
1, Belgium, Luxembourg and the UK had large banking sectors with assets exceeding 
two times GDP in 1995, and Ireland’s banking sector had reached this size by 1998 as 
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well. The large banking sectors in these four countries have attained such large sizes 
in part by catering to non-resident customers. As seen in Table 2, Belgium, Ireland, 
Luxembourg and the United Kingdom all had banking sectors with external assets 
exceeding 40 percent of GDP in 1999. As also reflected in the table, external bank 
assets in the EU-15 have increased from 11.7 percent of GDP in 1990 to 20.9 percent 
in 1999. In line with this, external liabilities have increased from 12.0 percent of GDP 
in 1990 to 13.1 percent in 1999 for EU member states.  
  Some of the same countries that engage in substantial financial services exports 
also experience significant inward Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the banking 
sector. In recent years, Ireland and Luxembourg have already had banking sectors 
with foreign ownership shares in excess of 50 percent (see Table 3). The table also 
indicates that in Europe foreign bank subsidiaries tend to be more important than 
foreign bank branches. This is surprising as the single passport accorded to 
internationally active banks by the EU Second Banking Directive of 1989 was 
expected to pave the way for international bank expansion primarily through branch 
networks. This suggests that there remain important barriers to the operation of 
foreign-owned banks in the form of branches that are not locally incorporated. 
  To be able to export financial services, a country needs to produce these 
relatively cheaply. At the same time, countries that produce financial services cheaply 
will attract additional banking firms, both domestically owned and foreign-owned in 
the form of FDI. Production costs of financial services indeed appear to differ 
considerably across the EU. A rough index of bank production costs is the bank 
interest margin, defined as a bank’s net interest income as a percent of interest-
bearing assets. As seen in Table 4, Luxembourg has the lowest interest margin over 
the 1995-1999 period at 1.18 percent followed by the Netherlands at 1.97 percent, 
against a EU average of 2.85 percent. At the other extreme, Denmark, Greece and 
Italy had interest margins of 3.50 or more. To some extent, differences in interest 
margins across countries reflect the different activity mixes and levels of service 
provided by national banking systems. Controlling for these, what remain are 
differences in productive efficiency, profitability (reflecting concentration, among 
other things) and the fiscal regime in its broad sense. Interest margins indeed tend to 
reflect differences in direct tax burdens, as shown by Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga   4
(2001). Hence, one can expect the overall pattern of production of and trade in 
financial services to be affected by the fiscal regime as well.
3  
The purpose of this paper is to review the main aspects of the fiscal treatment 
of banking in the EU. The focus is restricted to the fiscal treatment of the banks 
themselves rather than of the bank’s customers, even if the income taxation of bank 
customers no doubt also is an important driver of international trade in financial 
services (see Huizinga and Nicodème (2004)). The fiscal treatment of banks continues 
to be the purview of national authorities, subject to European directives and 
regulations that impose minimum standards on the policies pursued. The exact 
assignment of fiscal rights and regulatory responsibilities vis-à-vis internationally 
operating banks differs with the fiscal or quasi-fiscal instrument considered. In the 
case of international banks, policy assignments also differ with whether the bank 
owns foreign branches or subsidiaries.  
The potential for cross-border shopping by bank customers and the mobility of 
financial service providers render national policies towards banking interdependent 
and introduce the prospect of policy competition. The international mobility of bank 
customers first implies that banks in different counties in principle compete for the 
same banking customers. Moreover, the mobility of the financial service providers 
themselves implies that domestically and foreign owned banks located in the same 
country compete for the same national bank customers. Correspondingly, two types of 
policy competition can be distinguished as well: those that affect the “cross-country” 
and the “within-country” competition for bank customers by banks with different 
national origins. 
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses in 
general terms the role of the tax system in bringing about an efficient international 
banking system. Section 3 summarizes the assignment of the main tax and regulatory 
responsibilities vis-à-vis international banks in the EU. Section 4 reviews the current 
functioning of the main fiscal and quasi-fiscal policies directed at banks such as the 
corporate income tax, the VAT and deposit insurance. To conclude, section 5 
evaluates whether the current room for policy competition in Europe is desirable from 
an EU perspective or whether further harmonization is warranted. 
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2.  Standards for the taxation of financial intermediation 
Even in a closed economy, the incidence of the taxation of banking is not  
straightforwardly determined. The main tasks of banks are to provide transaction 
services to their depositors and lending services to borrowers as they channel funds 
from savers (either individuals or firms) to investors. Thus the incidence of taxes on 
banking can be on the users of bank services such as account keeping and loan 
origination. At the same time, the incidence can partly be on the providers of funds, 
i.e. investing individuals and firms and, not least, on the owners of the banks. The 
exact incidence of banking-sector taxes depends on national and international 
substitution possibilities for the services provided by banks (see, for instance, Caminal 
(2003)).  
The optimal taxation of banking, clearly, is intricately related to the optimal 
taxation of capital. In one extreme view, the optimal tax rate on capital, whether or 
not intermediated by banks, is zero and the tax system optimally relies on a 
combination of labor and consumption taxes, with the latter, for instance, 
implemented through the VAT. Regardless of one’s view of the optimal capital 
income tax, potential arbitrage across financing institutions implies that it is unwise to 
tax income from capital intermediated by banks much differently from other capital 
income. Analogously, resources spent in the production of financial services should 
be taxed similarly to resources applied in other sectors of the economy. The latter 
observation suggests that the financial sector is optimally subjected to the VAT like 
any other sector.
4 
  The focus of this paper is on the international implications of the taxation of 
banking in the EU. In the international economy, arbitrage opportunities between 
banks and other financing institutions, and among international banks themselves, are 
even greater than in one single economy. Substitution possibilities facing banks 
regarding their location and organizational structure imply that international 
differences in the fiscal treatment of banks are potentially very harmful. At the same 
time, consumer choice regarding where to transact may be affected by international 
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tax differences. International fiscal neutrality regarding these various bank and 
individual choices appears to be desirable.  
  
3.    Division of responsibilities regarding the fiscal treatment of banks 
Responsibilities concerning the fiscal treatment of banks in Europe are shared 
between the European ‘center’ and national authorities. Reserve requirements, with 
potentially important fiscal implications, are the sole responsibility of the European 
Central Bank in the euro area. In fact, required reserves are 2 percent of the relevant 
deposit base, with the proviso that these reserves are remunerated at the ECB 
refinancing rate.
5 In other fiscal dossiers, there exist European directives or less 
formal understandings that define national responsibilities regarding internationally 
operating banks and set minimum standards for national policy making. There are 
separate directives in areas such as corporate income taxation, the VAT and deposit 
insurance, with the outcome that there is no uniformity as to the international 
assignment of fiscal rights and responsibilities across fiscal instruments. The 
assignment of fiscal rights and duties in practice varies with the fiscal instrument and 
it depends on the organizational form of the international bank, i.e. whether 
international establishments are organized as branches or as subsidiaries (see also 
Mayes and Vesala (1998)).  
A summary of international policy assignments is provided in Table 5. Both 
foreign branches and subsidiaries are subject to corporate income tax in their country 
of operation. The country of the parent firm generally also subjects the income of 
foreign branches and subsidiaries to corporate income taxation, although an 
exemption or foreign tax credits are sometimes provided to alleviate double taxation.
6 
The corporate income tax thus is a shared responsibility of home and host countries. 
In contrast, financial services are only subject to the VAT of the country of operation, 
regardless of where a bank’s client is located in the EU. The VAT thus is the sole 
responsibility of the host county, subject to the common EU VAT framework 
including minimum tax rates. In the area of deposit insurance, national rights and 
duties depend on the bank’s organizational form. The EU deposit insurance in 1994, 
in particular, stipulates that a subsidiary is subject to the deposit insurance regime of 
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the host country, while a branch is subject to the regime of the home country. Next, 
the central bank of the host country in contrast is responsible for providing emergency 
liquidity to all banks operating within its geographical jurisdiction. The primary 
responsibility for providing fiscal support to banks in distress instead depends again 
on organizational form: subsidiaries are to be bailed out by the treasury of the host 
country, while the home country is responsible for the foreign branches of its resident 
banks. Finally, the taxation of bank interest is a shared responsibility: host and home 
countries tend to levy non-resident interest income taxes and resident interest income 
taxes, respectively. The taxation of bank interest remains a shared responsibility under 
the newly adopted proposal on the taxation of savings income, as three EU countries 
will continue to levy a non-resident withholding tax, even if they are obliged to 
transfer three fourths of the revenue to the country where the depositor resides. 
 
4.  Tax and quasi-fiscal policies directed at banks 
This section reviews some international aspects of the main tax and quasi-
fiscal policies towards banks. In turn, corporate income taxation, the VAT, deposit 
insurance and fiscal responsibilities in case of banking insolvencies are considered. 
   
4.1  Corporate income taxation 
Europe’s banks face a separate system of corporate income taxation in every 
EU member state. Decentralized tax policies in practice give rise to widely diverging 
tax burdens across Europe. As seen in Table 6, top marginal corporate income tax 
rates range from 10 percent in Ireland to 52.35 percent in Germany in 1999. The 
corporate tax burden faced by banks in practice depends on the share of retained 
earnings, new equity and debt finance. Effective tax burdens also depend on the rate 
of inflation, given that nominal interest income is taxed and the nominal interest on 
debt is tax deductible. Reflecting these considerations, the European Commission 
(2001b) has recently calculated the cost of capital for holdings of financial assets. 
This is the rate of return that firms need to make on their financial asset portfolio to 
break even given the tax system and benchmark assumptions about inflation and the 
real interest rate. The calculated cost of capital figures differ widely across the EU, as 
indicated in Table 6. Greece has the lowest cost of capital at 5.1 percent, while 
Germany has the highest at 10.0 percent. Thus the corporate income tax appears to 
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distort competition among EU banks, even if banks in high-tax countries in principle 
can benefit from some additional spending financed by the higher taxation. 
  A second major concern is whether the corporate income tax system in Europe 
discriminates against or in favor of internationally operating banks. International 
banks benefiting from an exemption regime in their home countries are subject to the 
same level of taxation on their international operations as domestic banks. 
Alternatively, banks receive a foreign tax credit at home for taxes paid abroad to 
alleviate double taxation. The provision of full tax credits gives rise to a situation 
where the international firm operating abroad faces the effective tax rate of the home 
country. This may put the international firm at either a competitive advantage or 
disadvantage vis-à-vis domestic banks depending on whether the home country 
effective tax rate is lower or higher than the effective host country tax rate. In 
practice, however, full tax credits may not be available. A limitation on the foreign tax 
credit that prevents home country taxes on foreign source income from being 
negative, for instance, prevents international banks from operating at a lower effective 
tax than domestic banks. Conversely, limitations on the domestic tax offset of foreign 
losses may increase the effective taxation of international bank income. International 
banks at present are more likely to receive cross-border loss-compensation for foreign 
branches than for subsidiaries in calculating the parent company’s tax liability. 
Specifically, EU member states generally provide immediate loss-compensation in the 
case of branches, while only two member states (Denmark and France) do so for 
subsidiaries (see European Commission (2001b)). This asymmetric tax treatment of 
branches and subsidiaries appears to favor branches, and hence cannot explain the 
observed preference for subsidiaries. 
  The current system of corporate taxation based on separate bookkeeping is 
vulnerable to tax evasion through the manipulation of transfer prices, and the potential 
for such manipulation appears to be especially large in the banking sector. In this 
sector, international profit manipulation can be achieved through international intra-
bank lending at other than market interest rates. Using a sample of about 7900 bank 
observations for 80 countries over the years 1988-1995, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga 
(2001) find that taxes paid by domestic banks rise with the statutory tax as is to be 
expected in the absence of international profit shifting. Taxes paid by foreign banks 
instead fall with this tax rate. This latter finding is taken to be evidence of profit 
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shifting by foreign banks. In practice, profit shifting towards the home country may 
allow international banks to reduce the effective tax on their international operations 
to the effective tax of the home country, thus bypassing any foreign tax credit 
limitations. The potential for international profit shifting would be even greater for 
international banks that are officially domiciled in tax havens. 
  Tax distortions regarding the location and legal structure of European banks, 
as well as the incentive to shift profits within Europe, would be eliminated by the 
adoption of a European corporate income tax at a common rate. The adoption of such 
a scheme at present may not be politically feasible. Faced with this reality, the 
European Commission (2001a) has announced a strategy towards European corporate 
tax reform that has two parts. First, it has announced its intention to table legislative 
measures to improve loss-compensation availability for cross-border activities and to 
broaden the application of the merger directive by the end of 2003. At the same time, 
it has stated its preference for a coordinated tax system in the EU with a common tax 
base for internationally active companies. Such a system would require some type of 
apportionment, but it could allow for different tax rates across countries. A tax system 
along these lines would be sufficient to eliminate intra-EU profit shifting incentives 
for banks and other companies.  
 
4.2  Value added tax 
Financial services tend to be difficult to tax through a VAT. To see this, 
consider a simple bank that attracts deposits in order to make loans. The net interest 
income achieved by the bank can be seen as a measure of the output generated by the 
bank that in principle should be subject to VAT. However, it is not entirely obvious 
how to assign the net interest margin to output generated by the bank’s loans and 
output generated by its deposits. A complication is that the contractual loan interest 
rate reflects bank output, a payment for the use of capital and a risk premium. Only 
bank-level output should be included in the bank-level VAT to maintain symmetry 
with the usual credit-invoice method of levying VAT.
7 
To circumvent the difficulties of bring financial services under a VAT, the EC 
Sixth VAT Directive of 1977 exempts most financial services, such as lending, 
depositing, security dealings and exchange transactions as well as insurance, from 
VAT. The exemption offered by the Directive implies that no VAT is assessed on the   10
value of these services. To compensate for the absence of a VAT on bank output, 
banks cannot claim VAT input credits for the VAT embodied in the prices of their 
purchased intermediate and (physical) capital inputs. Thus, the VAT-exemption of 
most financial services in the EU effectively replaces a VAT on bank-level output 
with a VAT on some bank-level inputs (intermediate inputs and physical capital 
inputs). 
Note that banks operating in a country with a high VAT rate are at a 
disadvantage as these banks face relatively high VAT-inclusive input prices.  This 
may be an important issue, as standard VAT rates differ substantially among EU 
member states (see Table 7). It is unlikely, however, that countries set their VAT rates 
primarily with international banking competition in mind. However, some scope for 
active international competition in the application of VAT to banks may exist, as 
countries can vary the intensity of their VAT enforcement. Most banks tend to 
produce a combination of exempt financial services and normally taxed financial 
services. As indicated, VAT input credits are only available for inputs used to produce 
normally taxed financial services, and banks in practice have to determine which 
shares of a bank’s inputs is used to produce exempt financial services and normally 
taxable financial services. Countries have issued guidelines on how to do this, but 
these are difficult to comply with and equally difficult to enforce.  
Ambiguities in this area of VAT enforcement allow countries some discretion 
to determine the effective level of VAT on their banking systems – independently of 
statutory VAT rates. The result appears to be a rather low effective VAT on EU 
banking systems (see Huizinga (2002)). In particular, the VAT input credits granted to 
banks in Europe in practice are much higher than expected on the basis of actual input 
use. Effectively, this means that the VAT system in some countries operates, as if 
banks can obtain VAT input credits on all inputs, including those used to produce 
exempt financial services. There is no border-adjustment of the VAT for cross-border 
financial services within the EU so that a light VAT burden assists banks to 
effectively compete for cross-border clients. 
Several avenues for reform of the VAT are available to bring about standard 
VAT on financial services. A cash-flow system of taxation can be used to determined 
the VAT liability of banks and the size of VAT input credits to be granted to banks’ 
business clients, as outlined by Poddar and English (1997). The European 
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Commission (2000) has outlined a modified cash-flow system of VAT for banks that 
allows the deferral of tax on capital transfers (as opposed to interest payments). The 
European Commission has conducted some pilot studies in the 1996-1998 period to 
test the practicality of applying VAT through such a modified cash-flow tax. The 
conclusion was that this approach, while feasible, would imply implementation costs 
that are prohibitively high.  
As an alternative to cash-flow taxation, it is possible to allow banks to zero-
rate financial services supplied to the business sector (this would allow banks to 
supply financial services to businesses taxed at zero rate while they can claim full 
VAT input credits). Zero-rating of financial service supplied to businesses can be 
combined with taxing financial services to households on an aggregate cash-flow 
basis (treating the household sector as a single customer). This alternative approach 
requires banks to price their financial products differently for businesses and 
households. This is possible if banks can identify the VAT status of their customers. 
At present, banks should be able to do so without great difficulty, as they already need 
to carefully check the identity of their customers to assist the tax authorities and other 
law enforcement agencies in their fight against, for instance, terrorism.
8  
 
4.3   Deposit insurance as a quasi-fiscal measure 
Deposit insurance can be seen as a quasi-fiscal measure, as it requires banks to 
pay a tax-like deposit insurance premium for the deposit insurance coverage.
9 For 
international banks with branches, the deposit insurance system of the home state also 
applies to the bank’s international branches. National deposit insurance systems have 
to meet the minimum requirements determined by the EU deposit insurance directive 
of 1994 (see European Commission (1994)). The main stipulation of this directive is 
WKHPLQLPXPLQVXUDQFHFRYHUDJHRI ,QDGGLWLRQWKHGLUHFWLYHDOORZVIRUFR-
insurance by the depositor of up to 10 percent. Beyond these main coverage 
provisions, the EU directive is agnostic on many key elements of deposit insurance 
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8 Using a partial equilibrium framework, Huizinga (2002) provides some calculations on how reform 
would affect VAT revenues and welfare in the EU for varying assumptions regarding the elasticity of 
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UHIRUPLVHVWLPDWHGWRSURGXFHDVPDOOZHOIDUHJDLQLQWKHRUGHURI ELllion per annum. 
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makes it more likely that a bank will go bankrupt and hence it increases the expected pay-out from the 
deposit insurance agency (see Brock (2003)).   12
design, such as whether banks should actually pay for the deposit insurance and 
whether a permanent fund should be established.  
Hence, in principle countries can compete in these areas with a view to 
enabling their banks to attract additional international depositors. First, countries can 
compete by choosing a low deposit insurance premium relative to the insurance 
provided. In practice, deposit insurance premium rates appear to be rather low in the 
EU, as illustrated by Table 8. Laeven (2002) calculates ‘fair’ deposit insurance 
premiums for a large set of developed and developing countries and compares these 
with actual premiums. In particular in Germany, deposit insurance premiums – both 
public and private – are calculated to be lower than the fair benchmark. In Austria, 
Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, deposit insurance assessment is contingent on 
losses occurring in the system, which complicates a comparison between actual and 
calculated fair rates. Ex post premium assessment is expected to occur at times when 
the banking system is under severe stress, and hence may turn out to be impracticable. 
This suggests that countries with ex post assessment in fact provide rather cheap, 
subsidized deposit insurance. 
The low-rate deposit insurance in the EU suggests that countries are engaged 
in quasi-fiscal competition for international banking business by way of their deposit 
insurance system. 
10A necessary condition for international policy competition like 
this to make sense is that international banking customers discriminate among 
banking systems on the basis of deposit insurance policies. Little empirical research 
exists to ascertain whether deposit insurance indeed affects the location of financial 
activity.
11 Lane and Sarisoy (2000) examine the impact of deposit insurance on 
overall gross private capital inflows for a cross–section of 27 countries over the 1990-
1995 period, but they fail to find a significant relation. Huizinga and Nicodème (2003) 
examine how deposit insurance affects bank deposit location for a sample of 16 BIS 
member states over the 1983-1999 period. Following the BIS classification, these 
authors make a distinction between the external deposits of national banking systems 
held by non-bank entities and by banks. De jure deposit insurance schemes in the BIS 
area cover most non-bank deposits, while they typically exclude interbank deposits 
from coverage. The coverage of non-bank deposits gives rise to the hypothesis that 
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insurance premiums.   13
countries with explicitly defined deposit insurance systems are able to attract more 
international non-bank deposits. The empirical results indeed suggest that non-bank 
external liabilities are higher when explicit deposit insurance exists. 
A priori the relationship between deposit insurance and the volume of 
international inter-bank deposits is less clear, as deposit insurance systems in the BIS-
area de jure tend to exclude interbank deposits from coverage. Even without formal 
coverage of interbank deposits, the presence of explicit deposit insurance for non-
banks, however, could increase the likelihood that bank deposits would also be 
covered in the event of a banking failure. If so, deposit insurance may also lead to a 
higher level of international interbank deposits. Conversely, a banking system that 
manages to attract additional non-bank deposits from abroad may need to recycle 
these funds as outgoing interbank deposits. In this scenario, there would be less room 
for a banking system with explicit deposit insurance to attract incoming interbank 
deposits. Perhaps not surprisingly, Huizinga and Nicodème (2003) fail to find a robust 
empirical relationship between deposit insurance and external bank deposits. 
As indicated, some type of deposit insurance in the EU is required, and hence 
EU countries at this point no longer compete on whether there is deposit insurance. 
All the same, they can compete on deposit insurance characteristics such as the 
deposit premium. Huizinga and Nicodème (2003) relate their measures of non-bank 
and bank external deposits to several deposit insurance characteristics to examine 
whether external deposits are in fact sensitive to deposit insurance design. Their 
results suggest that non-bank deposits are higher if the deposit insurance scheme is 
characterized by a permanently established fund and by public involvement in the 
funding of the insurance. These features can be attractive to depositors, if they 
increase the credibility of the deposit insurance system. No relationship is found 
between external deposits and the deposit insurance premium. This may reflect that 
banks pass on only a small part of a lower deposit insurance premium to their 
depositors in the form of a higher deposit interest rate. Alternatively, international 
deposits are not very sensitive to the interest rate. This is to be expected if the primary 
motive behind international depositing is money laundering. 
 
4.4  Budgetary implications of insolvency resolution 
                                                                                                                                           
11 The focus of most empirical research on deposit insurance is on financial stability. Examples are 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002), Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2004) and Gropp and Vesala 
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Public authorities have frequently spent vast resources in remedying banking 
crises. This suggests that the approach taken in financial crisis resolution is a major 
factor in determining the overall fiscal burden on the banking system.
12 In case of 
internationally operating banks, the issue arises which treasury or treasuries are 
responsibility for providing funds to insolvent banks if called for. The general EU 
principle of home country regulation implies that the home country treasury is first in 
line to support an international bank with branches. An international subsidiary 
instead is the primary responsibility of the host country. Important in this regard is the 
Directive on the Winding-Up of Credit Institutions of 2001 that states that the 
bankruptcy laws of the home country apply in case of a bankruptcy of a bank with 
international branches and, more importantly, that all bank creditors have to be treated 
equally. A bank with an international branch network tends to have international 
creditors, which makes paying off these creditors an international public good. 
Decentralized crisis management concerning an international bank with branches 
potentially leads to an underprovision of this public good, and hence a lower chance 
of a generous bailout following banking distress. 
European policy makers are only recently focusing their full attention on the 
potential problems of international financial crisis management in Europe. Economic 
and Financial Committee (2001), specifically, lays out the responsibilities and duties 
of the international authorities concerned (supervisors, central banks, and national 
treasuries). The home country supervisor is the co-ordinating policy-maker for a 
distressed international bank with branches, while the host country supervisor co-
ordinates policy towards a subsidiary in crisis. An adequate flow of information 
among public institutions is crucial, especially in the case of a branched firm. 
Currently, the bilateral exchange of supervisory information is usually arranged in 
Memoranda of Understanding, but these MoU’s generally do not cover the special 
information needs in case of a financial crisis. Enria and Vesala (forthcoming) suggest 
the standardization of MoU’s in the EU and binding commitments to exchange 
information as avenues to improve the flow of information among national 
authorities. Efforts along these lines, however, face the difficulty that the information 
required to resolve the next financial crisis may be difficult to define in advance and 
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that international agreements to exchange supervisory information are difficult to 
enforce.  
In practice, national authorities, therefore, are likely to retain some discretion 
in each financial crisis regarding the information to be shared. Presumably, national 
authorities will use this discretion to affect the outcome of the crisis management in 
their favor. Thus there is a tension between a co-operative supervisory model with 
unhampered information exchange in the EU and national incentives to keep their 
domestic public outlays at a minimum. The asymmetric information and divergent 
interests that characterize international financial crisis management suggest that the 
tools of game theory could be useful to help predict crisis management outcomes.  
Game theory, specifically, may help to predict whether international and purely 
domestic crisis management lead to different outcomes regarding the timing and 
financing of bank bail-outs. In this vein, Holthausen and Rønde (2001) consider bank 
closure decisions in a two-country model where the home and host country authorities 
have different incentives to rescue an international bank, as the home-country deposit 
insurance agency also covers deposits in the host country. Holthausen and Rønde 
(2001) do not explicitly address the cost aspects of crisis resolution, but the 
presumption is that decentralized financial crisis management leads to too little money 
spent on average to resolve a crisis. The main reason, as indicated, is that the 
Directive on the Winding-Up of Credit Institutions does not allow national authorities 
to discriminate against foreign creditors in a publicly financed bank bailout. Any 
moneys spent in crisis resolution by a national treasury thus have to benefit the bank’s 
national and foreign creditors equally.  
The balance sheets of subsidiaries, unlike those of international banks with 
branches, primarily reflect local deposits and perhaps borrowing in the local capital 
market. This type of geographical concentration of the bank’s creditors and 
presumably also of its loan customers provides the host country authorities with 
relatively strong incentives to bail out the subsidiaries of international banks. The 
presumption that subsidiaries are treated favorably in an international financial crisis 
resolution may be a factor leading banks to prefer subsidiaries to branches.
13 Hence, 
the current assignment of bail-out responsibilities among EU treasuries may be one of 
the reasons that subsidiaries are the dominant form of international bank 
                                                 
13 For a discussion of fiscal and other determinants of a bank’s choice between a branch and a 
subsidiary, see Dermine (2003) and Huizinga (2003a).   16
establishment. This implies some costs in those cases where branches would in fact be 
the efficient organisational form. 
 
5.  The scope for policy competition and harmonization in the EU 
  In an international setting, two types of bank competition for bank customers  
and, correspondingly, two types of bank policy interdependence can be distinguished. 
First, banks located in different countries compete for bank customers that are willing 
to shop for bank services internationally. Second, domestically and foreign-owned 
banks located in the same country vie for bank customers located in that country. The 
fiscal and quasi-fiscal treatment of banks with different national origins generally 
affects both their “cross-country” and their “within-country” competition.  
All the policy instruments mentioned in Table 5 can in principle be used to 
affect the “cross-country” competition of national banking systems. For this purpose, 
the corporate income tax, however, may be a rather blunt instrument as this tax 
broadly affects the overall private sector. The VAT and deposit insurance instead 
appear to be more appropriate for this. Specifically, a lenient enforcement of 
restrictions on allowable VAT input credits and a low deposit insurance premium 
serve to lower the costs of national banks vis-à-vis foreign banks. A lax enforcement 
of bank regulation more generally, including minimum capital requirements, increases 
the expected fiscal contribution to national banks in distress. Where this exists, it can 
be seen as a subsidy to national banks, although it is less clear that national banking 
system instability can help to attract international bank customers.  
As seen in Table 5, deposit insurance policies can also be used to advantage 
nationally owned bank branches engaged in “within-country” competition for bank 
customers with indigenous banks in a foreign banking market. This reflects that 
deposit insurance is subject to home country control in the case of an internationally 
branched bank. This may provide countries with a strong incentive to keep the cost of 
deposit insurance low. To offset this, internationally branched banks, as discussed, 
may receive relatively ungenerous bail-out support in case of distress.  
  On net, policy competition in the banking industry probably reduces the fiscal 
burden on banking. Policy competition of this kind may provide welcome relieve for 
economies with ‘repressed’ financial systems that suffer from high explicit and 
implicit levels of taxation. The banking sector in Europe has been liberalized to the 
extent that this is no longer the case. This suggests that policy competition that   17
reduces the overall tax burden on banking is harmful. At present, the outcome of the 
political process in Europe is that both capital and labor generally are subject to 
positive levels of taxation. As long as this is the case, the factors of production applied 
in the banking sector should be subject to positive levels of taxation as well to prevent 
an undue misallocation of resources across sectors. Thus, the effective zero-rating of 
banking for purposes of the VAT, reflecting the lax enforcement of VAT rules, leads 
to an unduly low a taxation of banking. Similarly, deposit insurance with low or no 
deposit insurance premiums inappropriately reduces the tax burden on banking. To 
correct these apparently harmful effects of policy competition in the EU, it is 
necessary to revise the existing body of EU directives in these areas.  
It similarly is important to provide the right incentives for national treasures in 
the EU to bail out internationally active banks. At first sight, it appears that moving 
decision making about bail-outs of such banks to a higher, European level is 
warranted to ensure that all EU-wide costs and benefits of such interventions are taken 
into account. Making bail-out decisions at the EU level, however, would be no 
guarantee that bail-outs would be timely and measured, as also EU-level decision 
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  1995  1998 
Austria  168   
Belgium  250   
Denmark  72  83 
Finland  87  74 
France  148   
Germany  157  188 
Greece  51  62 
Ireland  152  255 
Italy  94  94 
Luxembourg  2866   
Netherlands  171   
Portugal  128  158 
Spain  129  133 
Sweden  84  121 
United Kingdom  239  257 
     
EU-15  159   
     
USA  75  83 
Japan     
                
Note: EU-15 average is GDP weighted. Source: Huizinga (2003b)     22
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Notes. The non-banking sector includes individuals, non-financial business, and non-bank financial 
firms such as mutual funds and insurance companies. External assets include loans and the ownership 
of foreign marketable securities such as government and corporate bonds, while external liabilities 
include deposits, bonds and other marketable short-term securities. 
Source: European Commission (2001c) based on BIS data. 
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Table 3. Market share of foreign banks in percent, end 1997 





Subsidiaries  Total 
Austria  0.7  1.6  0.1  1.0  3.3 
Belgium  9.0  19.2  6.9  1.2  36.3 
Finland  7.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  7.1 
France  2.5  :  2.7  :  9.8 
Germany  0.9  1.4  0.7  1.2  4.3 
Ireland  17.7  27.8  1.2  6.9  53.6 
Italy  3.6  1.7  1.4  0.1  6.8 
Luxembourg  19.4  65.7  1.4  8.1  94.6 
Netherlands  2.3  3.0  0.5  1.9  7.7 
Portugal  2.5  6.8  0.1  1.0  10.5 
Spain  4.8  3.4  1.6  1.9  11.7 
 
Notes. Market share of branches and subsidiaries of foreign credit institutions as a percentage of the 
total assets of domestic credit institutions. Figures for France are for 1996. 
Sources: European Commission (2001c) and Dermine (2003)    24






Austria  2.16 
Belgium  2.38 
Denmark  5.28 
Finland  1.99 
France  2.86 
Germany  2.66 
Greece  3.50 
Ireland  3.49 
Italy  3.67 
Luxembourg  1.19 
Netherlands  1.97 
Spain  3.40 




   
EU average  2.85 
 
Notes. The interest margin is interest income minus interest expense divided by interest-bearing assets 
and is average over 1995-1999. The EU figure is average of national averages except Portugal. Source: 
Demirgüç-Kunt, Laeven and Levine (2003, Table 1), 
   25
Table 5.  Assignment of banking policy responsibilities in for international banks  
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
        Host country control   Home country control           Mix 
____________________________________________________________________ 
A. Branches 
Corporate income tax                   X 
VAT          X 
Deposit insurance            X 
Liquidity assistance      X                                                                                                                        
Treasury support in case 
of distress              X    or    X 
 
B. Subsidiaries 
Corporate income tax                   X 
VAT          X 
Deposit insurance      X 
Liquidity assistance      X  
Treasury support in case 
of distress        X 
_____________________________________________________________________   26
Table 6. Corporate tax rates and costs of capital for  
    holding financial assets, 1999 
 
























































Notes. Corporate tax is inclusive of surcharges and local taxes. For Ireland, the tax rate for the 
manufacturing sector is 10 percent as used in the calculation of cost of capital. Corporatation tax for 
other sectors such as services is 28 percent. Cost of capital figures are an average across three types of 
finance, with weights of 55% for retained earnings, 10% for new equity and 35% for debt. 
Source: European Commission (2001b)   27






Austria  20 
Belgium  21 
Denmark  25 
Finland  22 
France  20.6 
Germany  16 
Greece  18 
Ireland  21 
Italy  20 
Luxembourg  15 
Netherlands  17.5 
Portugal  17 
Spain  16 




   
EU average  19.4 
 
Sources: PriceWaterhouseCoopers, World Tax Summaries, 1999/2000 edition   28





Assessment Base  Annual premium in percent 
Austria   Insured deposits  Pro rata, ex post 
Belgium  Insured deposits  0.02 plus 0.04 if necessary 
Denmark  Insured deposits  0.2 (maximum) 
 
Finland  Insured deposits  0.05 to 0.3 
France  Deposits plus 1/3 
 Loans 
Risk-adjusted 
Germany  Insured deposits  0.008 (statutory scheme); 
0-0.1 (private sector) 
Greece  Deposits       Decreasing by size: 0.0025 to 0.125 
Ireland  Insured deposits  0.2 
Italy  Insured deposits  Ex post, adjusted for size and risk 
Luxembourg  Insured deposits  Ex post to a maximum of 5% of capital 
Netherlands  Insured deposits  Ex post to a maximum of 10 % of capital 
Portugal  Insured deposits  0.08 to 0.12 
Spain   Insured deposits  0.1 (maximum of 0.2) 
Sweden  Insured deposits  0.5  (maximum) 
United 
Kingdom 
Insured deposits  On demand, not to exceed 0.3 
Source: Laeven (2002, Annex) 